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Abstract 
Voluntary compliance with tax laws of taxpayers is believed to be shaped by two 
major streams of factors: economic and social-psychological. Many countries of 
the world including Ethiopia try to emphasize the economic deterrence approach 
in which the belief is that taxpayers pay taxes only because they fear audit and the 
subsequent sanctions. The social-psychology approach to taxation, on the other 
hand, takes the position that taxpayers’ (non)compliance decision is influenced by 
justice perception, how they value government expenditure, how they feel they are 
treated by the revenue authority, and so on. In this study we concisely went over 
the historical evolution of taxation in Ethiopia, assessed the culture of voluntary 
compliance, looked at how taxpayers perceive servic delivery by the revenue 
authority, and evaluated the fairness perception of the Ethiopian tax system. Data 
for the study were gathered primarily through questionnaire distributed to 200 
(162 usable ones returned) taxpayers and unstructured interview with selected 
officials from the revenue authority. Secondary sources such as journal articles, 
reports of the World Bank, IMF, and MoFED were also c nsulted. We used 
descriptive data analysis method. Both economic and social-psychological factors 
are found to influence taxpayers’ (non)compliance decision in so far as those 
respondents’ responses indicate. 
                                                           
1Assistant professor at Institute of Tax and Customs Administration, 
Ethiopian Civil Service University P.o.box:5648;AddisAbaba,EthiopiaE-
mail:dejenemamo@gmail.com 








47Dejene Mamo, Lemessa Bayissa and Dawit G/Medihin 
 
Key words: Tax administration, Voluntary compliance, Taxpayers’ services, 
Tax system fairness 
Historical Evolution of Tax in Ethiopia 
Taxation had started in the world during the ancient Empires. The first 
known written record of taxes dates back to ancient Mesopotamia. 
Hammurabi produced some of the first written laws as far back as 1792 BC 
and tax law was a significant component of the legislation the Babylonian 
emperor carved into a six foot tall stone tablet (about.com, 20th century 
history).It is a fact that taxation regimes have evolved as successive 
government’s devised new ways to fund government expenditure and 
manipulated their political landscape. Emperors, kings and feudal lords once 
levied tithes, taxes or duties to pay for wars or the upkeep of castles and 
palaces or other public projects.  
The history of taxes reveals that their coercive nature is of comparatively 
recent development. The original idea of tax was that payment was not 
obligatory up on the subject, but considered rather voluntary contributions 
towards the expense of government, as had appeared in the Medieval Latin 
term “donum”, and the English “benevolence”. This con eption of the 
relation between the subject and government was gradually transformed; 
payment of taxes becoming more and more obligatory, until finally coercive 
taxation resulted (Yonas and Sisay, 2009:27).  
Ethiopia is one of the old aged countries; tax collection in Ethiopia is 
assumed to be as old as the time of Zerayakob—around 1414—and had 
been dealt with in a traditional way. But Emperor Tewodros formed the 
centralized state power in which the tax system hadbeen made clearly 
visible and become mandatory even though the traditional way of collecting 
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taxes had not changed much. Until the early twentieth c ntury, taxes used to 
be paid mainly in kind-or labor services, rather than in cash while they were 
later substituted by fixed tithe on agricultural income tax (Eshetu, 1987) and 
(Girma-Selassie, 1978). In the case of Ethiopia fixed tithe on agricultural 
income was introduced during Minilik II. 
During the Regime of Emperor Haile Selassie the tax system was totally 
changed resulting in modernized tax administration (Eshetu, 1987). Taxes 
were imposed on and collected from various sources such as income from 
employment, businesses, (personal and business tax proclamation 60/1944, 
1944), rental of land and buildings, vocational occupation, agricultural 
income, interest, and exploitation of wood and forest used for lumbering 
purposes. Towards the end of the imperial period, the budgets of the various 
ministries increased steadily while tax yields stagnated. With the majority of 
the population living at a subsistence level, there was limited opportunity to 
increase taxes on personal or agricultural income. Consequently, the 
imperial government relied on indirect taxes (customs, excise, and sales) to 
generate revenues (CIA World Fact book, 1991). 
During the Derg regime the only new events were widening the tax base, 
increasing the tax rate, and replacing taxes on agricultural income and rural 
land with a rural land-use fee to support war, to finance the ever growing 
government sector and the needs of the society (Rural Land Use Fee and 
Agricultural Activities Income Tax Proclamation No.77/76, 1976).The 
government partially alleviated the tax collection problem that existed 
during the imperial period by delegating the responsibility for collecting 
fees and tax on agriculture to peasant associations, which received a small 
percentage of revenues in the form of administrative costs. About 40 to 50 
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percent of the government’s budget was dedicated to defense and 
government services (CIA World Fact book, 1991). 
During the transition period, Proclamation No.33/92 was proclaimed with 
provision for the sharing of revenues between central and regional 
governments (1992). According to the proclamation, regional governments 
were entitled to tax and expenditure assignment powers in order to 
accomplish their duties and responsibilities with some modifications on the 
tax brackets and tax rates. New tax bases such as tax on mining activitiesand 
on capital gains were also introduced (Mining Income Tax Proclamation 
No.53/93, 1993) and payment of tax on gains from capital (Proclamation 
No.108/94, 1994) were proclaimed. 
The current government, pursuant to the 1995 approval f the Ethiopian 
constitution, gave power to the federal and regional governments to levy and 
collect taxes. As a result, a number of changes have been made in the tax 
policy of the country as a result of the structural changes. Most significant 
changes were made in the tax laws bringing about reduction in the rate of 
income tax from 40% to 30% (Income Tax Proclamation No.286/02, 2002), 
equalization of tax rates for small and large scale mining activities 
(Amended Mining Proclamation No. 23/96, 1996), exemption of houses 
used for residence from paying capital gains tax. Because of a policy to 
encourage new investments, tax relief provisions were brought in 
(Investment Proclamation No.280/2002, 2002).  
Amendments in the laws were followed by other measures such as 
introduction of Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), introduction of tax 
withholding system and replacement of sales tax by VAT, which has 
become the main source of revenue for the government. Also introduced 
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were turnover tax, emphasis ontaxpayers’ education, strong enforcement 
mechanisms, substantial reforms and amendments in the tax laws to keep 
pace with time and the changing economic environment. This has brought 
about increased efficiency and effectiveness in reducing fraud and 
smuggling though the problems are deep rooted and still persist. To be able 
to collect the revenue which the economy generates th  revenue sector was 
restructured bringing together the former Federal Inland Revenue Authority 
(FIRA), Customs Authority, and Ministry of Revenue and forming the 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA)based on Proclamation 
No. 587/2008. According to the 2011/12 annual report of  ERCA, the 
government was able to collect Birr 70.75 billion revenue in 2011/12 budget 
year which covered more than 60% of the government budget in that fiscal 
year. This seems ideal and is promising but there neds to be continuous 
efforts to bring about tax compliance in the years to come, in order to fully 
finance the budget of the country with its own revenu  by 2020. 
Statement of the Problem 
Taxation is a system of raising money to finance government. Empirical 
evidences, of course, reveal that taxation is not sufficient to meet all 
development financing needs. Yet, it is an imperatively crucial source of 
financing public expenditure and the other sources ar  merely alternatives to 
be resorted to. Quite evidently, external loans to and aids for developing 
nations from the western world are shrinking due prima ily to the global 
financial crisis. The financial crisis in those developed nations nowadays, of 
course, is itself attributable to heavy dependence on external sources of 
financing government expenditure, the cases in point being USA, Greece, 
and Italy (Etienne, 2011).  
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However, revenue from taxation suffers from resistance on the part of the 
taxpayers to pay their taxes as they fall due. This resistance stands contrary 
to tax compliance—voluntary observance of or adherence to applicable 
taxation laws. Of course, noncompliance with tax laws is a result of both 
intentional tax evasion decisions and innocent mistakes committed by 
taxpayers owing especially to complexity of the taxl ws.Taxation, which 
has to serve other important fiscal purposes in addition to generating 
revenue for public expenditure contributes only a slimmer share to public 
expenditure especially in developing countries.  Consequently, the other 
purposes that taxation is meant to serve would alsobe beaten causing a 
vicious circle of problems to the public sector. Developing countries in 
general and Ethiopia in particular are currently being challenged by 
continuous fiscal deficits, huge debt service charges, and declining external 
assistance, all of which would seriously affect their d velopment processes 
sooner or later.  
Tax noncompliance is a challenge not only to governme t revenue but also 
to social welfare and allocative efficiency. This is so because when the rich 
are unwilling to pay their fair share of taxes the objective of using taxation 
as a redistributive tool would be defeated. By the same token, the idea of 
using taxation as an instrument for allocative efficiency4 would suffer when 
taxpayers do not comply with the tax laws. It means that taxation would fail 
to serve its being a fiscal tool of the government as levy and collection do 
not match. More seriously, it would remain unfair if the rich continue to free 
ride the infrastructure built with the contribution f the poor.  
                                                           
4 Government influences the allocation of scarce economic resources in a way they can 
generate maximum return to the nation. This can be achieved through tax incentives to 
encourage certain undertakings such as investments in remote regions and heavy taxes to 
discourage others such as concentration of investments in few regions. 
JBAS                                           Vol.6 No. 2 December201452 
 
 
As Murphy argues, it is assumed in an ideal world that all taxpayers would 
voluntarily pay their taxes and comply with all of their tax obligations 
willingly though in practice “… no one enjoys paying taxes, and at the end 
of each financial year some people’s thoughts turn o how they can best 
arrange their affairs to pay as little taxes as possible” (Murphy, 2004).It is a 
common phenomenon, in Ethiopia also, that those that earn a significantly 
better amount of income do not pay taxes or pay an amount far less than 
their actual tax liabilities. Giant business houses are allegedly accused of 
keeping three books of accounts—one for their own business decisions (a 
genuine one), one for banks (with exaggerated assets and profits), and 
another for cheating the tax authority (with highly understated assets and 
profits)—and pay less than they would have otherwise paid. A study by 
Emerta (2010) shows that 36% of the Ethiopian economy is not captured by 
the official statistics and as a consequence, the amount of tax evasion from 
the informal sector reached 10% of the economy. With all possible 
improvements and best ever efforts, the country could raise only 11.4% of 
its GDP during the year 2010/11, and 12.3% in 2011/12, the least in the 
non-oil world implying persistent prevalence of very high tax resistance. 
Though its need for funds is immense, Ethiopia is faced with a number of 
challenges in raising revenue from domestic taxes owing to: (i) the fact that 
the biggest population—nearly 85% of the workforce—is found in 
traditional agriculture or in small and informal ent rprises which makes it 
difficult to impose taxes; (ii) massive tax evasion a d avoidance practices 
contributing greatly to shrinkage of the country’s taxable base; (iii) the 
limited capacity and alleged ethical problems of tax revenue collecting 
agencies both at the federal and local levels; (iv) poor quality of basic 
data—a significant number of traders operating unregist red businesses.  
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The consequences of failure to secure taxpayers’ voluntary compliance are 
myriad. When taxpayers do not want to report their g nuine income and pay 
their true tax liability to tax authorities it costs the nation in terms of (a) the 
administrative costs to bring about compliance, (b) loss of government 
revenue, (c) failure to attain such other objectives as income and/or wealth 
redistribution, efficiency in resource allocation, and use of taxation as a 
fiscal instrument in economic stabilization.  
Compliance with tax laws is believed to be attributable to both economic 
factors such as frequency of audit, sanction size, marginal tax rate, income, 
and opportunity to avoid or evade taxes; and a range psychological factors 
such as complexity of tax laws, attitudes towards paying taxes, personal 
norms, social norms, distributive justice, procedural justice, retributive 
justice, and taxpayer services (Alm, Kirchler, and Muehlbacher, 2012). 
Accordingly, it is worth assessing which of these two streams of factors 
matters much in terms of influencing taxpayers’ compliance behavior in 
Ethiopiato this end the paper aims at finding answer  to the following g 
questions: 
• Whatis the culture of voluntary compliance with taxation in 
Ethiopia? 
• What is the fairness perception of taxpayer about the Ethiopian tax 
system? 
• How the status of taxpayers’ service by Ethiopian revenue and 
customs authority impact voluntary compliance? 
Tax Compliance: Theoretical Framework 
Compliance with the tax laws typically means: (i) true reporting of the tax 
base, (ii) correct computation of the liability, (iii) timely filing of the return, 
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and (iv) timely payment of the amounts due. The bulk of tax evasion 
involves the first point and most evaders either do not declare their liability 
at all, or declare it only in part (Luigi, Alberto, and Franzoni, 1999, p. 4).As 
noted by Trivedi et al. (2005), there are two prominent classes of tax 
compliance theories—economics-based theories which emphasize 
incentives and social psychology-based theories which emphasize attitudes. 
Economic theory of compliance, pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) based on Becker’s theory of Economics of Crime (Becker, 1968), 
contends that taxpayers “play the audit lottery”, i.e., they make calculations 
of the economic consequences of different compliance alternatives (such as 
whether or not to evade tax), the probabilities of detection and the 
consequences thereto, and then choose the alternativ  which maximizes 
their expected after-tax return. This assumption underlies the deterrence 
theory approach—a taxpayer is likely to break the law unless anticipated 
legal penalties exceed the additional earnings that could be made by evading 
tax. 
The economic model of tax compliance is valid at lest partly on the ground 
that audit and penalties curb or threaten noncompliance behavior of some 
selfish taxpayers. It is also possible to assume that t is argument is more 
acceptable in societies where the vast majority of taxpayers feel that the 
government does not take care of them. McKerchar and Evans (2009) in 
their review of the economic model also argue that economic deterrence 
models in general are based on the theory that behaviour, in a wide range of 
contexts including tax evasion, is responsive to punishment or sanctions. 
They, however, criticize the model arguing that it ends to have a narrow 
theoretical view of behaviour, reducing its dimensio  to numerical 
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measures and assigned probabilities from which outcomes can be predicted 
using calculus.  
The second class of theories assumes that social psychological factors—
including moral, attitudinal, and ethical concerns—are also important to 
taxpayers, though the deterrence efforts surely play some role and so 
taxpayers may comply where the risk of audit is low r even zero. Of 
course, some taxpayers’ behaviour may follow the economic theory while 
others may follow the social psychological theory, and mixtures are also 
possible (Trivedi et al. 2005:4). The social psychology based theory asserts 
that there is a wide array of factors that shape the a titude of taxpayers. Frey 
and Feld (2002) note that tax compliance decision is influenced by a 
psychological tax contract between citizens and tax authorities. The way the 
taxpayers are treated affects their tax morale, and therefore their willingness 
to pay taxes. 
Unlike the economic based model which treats tax morale as a residual 
element, the social psychology based models treat tax morale as an 
endogenous variable, which is based largely on how t e taxpayers view the 
fairness situation of the tax system, whether governm nt spends tax 
revenues in the most efficient manner and on provisi n of socially valuable 
goods and services, and more importantly, the legitimacy of the government 
itself (see Feld and Frey, 2007; and Torgler, 2003). Legitimacy of an 
authority refers to the belief that the authority is appropriate, proper, and just 
(Tyler and Blader, 2005). 
The significance of whether economic or social psychological theories 
matter more is of critical concern as they differ in where a tax authority 
should invest its limited resources. Economic theories generally call for 
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increased audits and penalties as the solution to compliance problems. These 
solutions, of course, are costlier than those proposed by the social 
psychological theories.Trivedi et al. (2005) argue that the policy 
recommendations of social psychological theories vary across theories, but 
these theories generally lead to policy recommendations which give much 
attention to changing individual taxpayers’ attitudes toward the tax system 
by improving its perceived fairness and equity, making government 
expenditure in the best interest of the taxpayers, improving procedural 
justice, establishing the culture of mutual respect between tax authorities 
and taxpayers, and making it easy to comply with the tax laws through such 
measures as increased telephone assistance, and shorter line-ups in tax 
offices. 
Kircler, et al. (2008) categorize the relationships between tax authorities and 
taxpayers into: (i) antagonistic whereby tax authori ies should vigilantly 
follow up the taxpayers in a very costly manner, requiring enforced 
compliance; and (ii) cooperative or synergistic whereby taxpayers perceive 
the tax authorities as mediators of mutually beneficial contributions to a 
collective, resulting in voluntary compliance. In multi-ethnic societies like 
Ethiopia, taxpayers are even more sensitive to fairness/justice in taxation. 
Justice has three main components: Distributive justice, procedural justice, 
and retributive justice.  
Distributive justice calls for a socially just allocation of goods and services 
in a society. In other words, it is about the fair, just or equitable distribution 
of benefits and burdens. These benefits and burdens cover all dimensions of 
social life and comprise income, economic wealth, political power, taxation, 
work obligations, education, shelter, healthcare, military service, community 
involvement and religious activities. 
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Procedural justice concerns the fairness and the transparency of the 
processes by which decisions are made, and may be contrasted 
with distributive justice (fairness in the distribution of rights or resources), 
and retributive justice (fairness in the punishment of wrong-doings). 
Hearing all parties before a decision is made is one step which would be 
considered appropriate to be taken in order that a process may then be 
characterized as procedurally fair. Some theories of procedural justice hold 
that fair procedure leads to equitable outcomes, even if the requirements of 
distributive or restorative justice are not met. It has been suggested that this 
is the outcome of the higher quality interpersonal i teractions often found in 
the procedural justice process, which has shown to be stronger in affecting 
the perception of fairness during conflict resolution. Leventhal (1980) 
identifies six criteria against which fairness of procedures may be evaluated. 
These are consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, 
representativeness and ethicality.  
Retributivejustice isa theoryofjustice thatconsiders punishment proportionate 
to wrongdoing to be the best response to crime. When an offender breaks the 
law, s/he thereby forfeits or suspends her/his right to something of equal 
value, and justice requires that this forfeit be enacted. This is sometimes taken 
to mean that justice involves seeking revenge on behalf of the aggrieved party, 
or society as a whole. 
Research Methodology 
We used a descriptive research design in which we employed primary and 
secondary data to achieve the research objectives and provide answers to the 
research questions. Primary data were collected throug  interview and 
questionnaire. We conducted unstructured interview with selected 
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stakeholders from the tax authority. From the tax authority we have had 
discussions with the relevant directors of directorates such as the audit and 
investigation directorate, the intelligence directora e, and the customer 
service directorate. We also distributed 200 questionnaires to non-randomly 
selected taxpayers of which only 162 filled and returned responses usable 
for analysis. Variables constructed (i.e. in question form) to assess the 
compliance issues, service delivery and fairness perce tion of taxpayers 
were measured on five scale likrert measurement: very strongly agree (5), 
strongly agree (4), agree (3), slightly agree (2) and disagree (1). This 
follows Diamantopoulos and Winklehholefer (2001) who suggested the use 
of averaging if multivariate factors are used for measurement of a variable. 
Using this approach, we treated the questions as formative indicators of 
compliance, service delivery and fairness perception of taxpayers’ and 
average those to create observed variable. We also consulted relevant 
secondary documents from different sources including the World Bank 
country reports, the IMF reports, the periodic reports of the Ethiopian 
Revenue and Customs Authority and the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development.  
Results and discussions 
All Category “A” taxpayers whose annual turnover is more than birr 
500,000 are expected to declare their VAT monthly in a scheduled manner 
as: nil-filers, starting from first date of the next month up to 10th date of the 
month; credit filers, from 1st date up to 20th and payment filers from 1st up to 
30th date. Even though the time schedule is not supported by the tax 
proclamation, the schedule enables taxpayers to declare based on their 
current-prevailing status and reduce the time they spend in declaring their 
statements. On the other hand, the schedule enables the tax authority to get 
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adequate time for verifying the statement of credit filers and nil filers if they 
declare in advance. Category B taxpayers are expected to declare and pay 
turnover taxes every three months, while category C taxpayers are supposed 
to pay turnover tax within a month from the end of each fiscal 
year.According to Income tax Proclamation N0 286/2002, category “A” 
taxpayers are supposed to declare and settle their tax liability within four 
months from the end of the fiscal year. Category “B” taxpayers are expected 
to declare and pay their tax liability within two months from the end of each 
fiscal year. Category “C” taxpayers are expected to pay their taxes within a 
month from the end of each fiscal year. 
Table-1: SPSS Results of Responses to Compliance Related Questions 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
Deviation Variance 
The reason for noncompliance of taxpayers 
is the government do not use the revenue 
for public use 
124 1.00 5.00 2.9032 1.35202 1.828 
Noncompliance of taxpayers is because the 
tax authority does not give fast service 
120 1.00 5.00 2.2667 1.25513 1.575 
Level of understanding on the tax laws 129 1.00 5.00 2.0388 1.29544 1.678 
The tax authority presumes the taxpayers 
generally as evaders 
105 1.00 5.00 2.7524 1.59796 2.553 
The level of audit frequency is low, so I 
have the possibility of not to be caught 
102 1.00 5.00 3.3333 1.29991 1.690 
There is no capable auditor that can detect 
evasion (no one can find out the exact 
problem) 
102 1.00 5.00 3.2647 1.29681 1.682 
Since most taxpayers do not pay their taxes 
properly, their neighbors want to follow 
them 
106 1.00 5.00 2.6509 1.40775 1.982 
There is ethical problem with the tax 
auditors and other tax officials so it is 
possible to negotiate on tax minimization 
101 1.00 5.00 2.9901 1.35274 1.830 
The tax authority is not willing to receive 
any opinion from taxpayers 
105 1.00 5.00 2.7714 1.49523 2.236 
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Source: authors’ computation from questionnaire 
It is evident from Table 1 that most taxpayers that filled the questionnaire 
for this study (with mean value of 2.9032 out of 5) perceive that the 
Ethiopian government is spending tax money on valuable goods and 
services. In tax compliance literature, there are evidences that claim 
taxpayers may decide not to comply with their tax obligations when they 
perceive tax money as being wasted. As this study show , however, it is not 
because the taxpayers perceive government expenditure of tax money as 
being spent on non-valuable goods and services that they do not voluntarily 
comply.  
An average value of 2.2667 in the above Table implies that taxpayers’ 
noncompliance with tax laws can be explained by the poor or sluggish 
taxpayer services provided by the revenue authority. This is evidenced by 
the 34.2% and 33.3% of the respondents strongly agreeing and agreeing 
respectively when asked as whether their noncompliance is attributable to 
the poor quality of taxpayer services by the revenue a thority. We could 
confirm this through an interview with the director f customer services 
directorate of Revenues and Customs Authority. The dir ctor stated that 
taxpayers spend much time in queues though they may be served within 
some specified range of time in offices. The fact that taxpayers’ waiting 
time is not of much care to the authority is evidenced by non-consideration 
by the authority of the queuing (waiting) time when it set standard service 
time. 
As can be seen from Table 1 above, majority of the respondents to our 
questionnaire believe that their level of understanding of the tax laws is low 
with mean value of 2.0388. 33.8% of the respondents believe that their level 
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of understanding of the tax laws is low while 24.3% of them believe that 
their understanding is very low. However, 33.8% and 8.1% of the 
respondents believe that their understanding of tax laws is good and very 
good respectively. The low level of taxpayers’ understanding of tax laws 
can be attributable either to ineffective awareness creation efforts through 
taxpayer education, or complexity of the tax laws. Slightly above average 
value of 2.7524 in the table above indicates that te taxpayers believe that 
the tax authority has a prejudice that taxpayers are generally evaders. This 
can be substantiated by 32.4% and 21% of the respondents strongly agreeing 
and agreeing with the idea that “taxpayers are perceived by the revenue 
authority as evaders”. This implies absence of mutual trust and good 
relationship between taxpayer population and the revenue authority. The 
director of audit services directorate argued, however, that the authority 
trusts the taxpayers’ declaration of tax liabilities as the system itself is based 
on self-assessment of taxpayers. This implies lack of mutual understanding 
of taxpayers and tax officials regarding how the officials perceive the 
taxpayers. The discrepancy might also be due to variations in what is 
believed by top level tax officials to prevail and what the operational level 
officials actually do in dealing with taxpayers. 
Average values of 3.3333 and 3.2647 for probability of being audited and 
capability of tax auditors to detect tax fraud respectively signify that 
taxpayers perceive the probability of being audited and detected for tax 
fraud is very high. 34.3% and 20.6% of the respondents disagree and 
strongly disagree when asked whether their noncompliance with tax laws is 
attributable to low probability of being audited. In a similar fashion, 28.4% 
and 20.6% of the respondents respectively disagree and strongly disagree 
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with the fact that their tax noncompliance is explained by incapability of tax 
auditors to detect tax frauds.  
One can deduce from the above argument that even the existing level of 
compliance itself is due to enforced compliance rather han a voluntary one. 
This result is confirmed by the interview held with the director of the audit 
services directorate of the Revenue and Customs Authority. According to 
the interview, almost all audited firms were identified to be non-compliers 
as the audit and investigation results usually leadto findings of tax evasion. 
We also came to know that the Revenue and Customs Authority uses risk 
based model of tax audit in which focus is on size and nature of taxable 
entity. This model however is subject to judgments of people as the audit 
feature of the SIGTAS program is not being used by the authority.  
The slightly above average value of 2.6509 indicates that tax noncompliance 
is influenced by the prevalence of other non-compliers. This result can be 
supported by 27.4% and 27.4% of the respondents strongly agreeing and 
agreeing respectively with the idea that their tax noncompliance is because 
of the prevalence of other non-compliers they know. Studies elsewhere also 
concur with the idea that taxpayers’ voluntary compliance decision is highly 
dependent on their belief that all other citizens are contributing their fair 
share of taxes. 
An average value of 2.9901in the table above indicates that majority of the 
respondents believe there is ethical problem with tax auditors and other 
officials and it is possible for them to negotiate for tax liability 
minimization. We have verified this result through interview with the 
director of the audit services directorate of the Rvenue and Customs 
Authority. There has been recorded evidence of tax auditors penalized and 
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fired from the authority because of violation of the ethical standards and 
human resource policies of the authority.An average value of 2.7714 in 
Table 1 above means that the revenue authority is not willing to entertain 
any opinion from taxpayers regarding tax related decisions. This can also be 
evidenced by 25.7% and 27.6% of the respondents strongly agreeing and 
agreeing respectively with the idea that the revenue a thority is not willing 
to take account of any opinion from taxpayers in their decisions regarding 
taxes. From the focus group discussion we understood that tax officials also 
believe that they are vested with the power to enforce the tax laws, rules and 
regulations and do not have to consult the taxpayers for decisions they have 
to pass regarding taxes. Although this is the belief, there have been 
discussions and forums by the tax authority with taxpayers on various 
matters related to tax issues. Whether those forums were effective in terms 
of entertaining genuine taxpayers’ concerns has to be studied in the future. 
Taxpayers who have refund claims of income tax or VAT are expected to 
submit a CPO to the cashiers of the respective branches of Revenues and 
Customs Authority before the deadline. But the question is whether there are 
enough employees that can serve the taxpayers. In principle, when the 
number of taxpayers increases the number of employees of the tax authority 
should increase. Even though there are efforts by the tax authority to 
enhance its revenue collection, still the efforts could not bring significant 
change that can convince the taxpayers.  
As can be seen from the Table 2, regarding VAT declaration and payment 
based on the standard time in the operational manual the mean value of 4.03 
reveals that VAT payers are not served as per standard set. This is 
supplemented by 56% and 16.4% of the respondents strongly disagreeing 
and disagreeing respectively about the services being rendered within the 
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standard time. Another question forwarded to the respondents was regarding 
the declaration and payment of income tax which is paid on annual basis 
even though it may differ based on their categories. The mean value of 
4.0410 in Table 2 means that income taxpayers are not served as per 
standard time. This can be substantiated by 54% and 16.4% of respondents 
strongly disagreeing and  disagreeing respectively with their being served 
within the standard time which is almost the same as th t of VAT payers. 
Some of the reasons the respondents forwarded as detrimental to meeting 
the standard time are system failure, dishonest response of officers, 
inconsistent rendition of services, and disproportionate number of 
employees with services rendered. As a result, the taxpayers are waiting in a 
queue for longer period.Clearance procedure is one of the activities that is 
expected to be handled by the customer service department and needs a 
prompt response after checking the documents that assure that taxpayer does 
not have any tax liability. To do so the tax authority mainly verifies the 
documents in the assessment section of the department if the clearance is to 
be used only for renewal of license. To assess taxpayers’ satisfaction with 
the clearance services, the researchers included questions in the 
questionnaire distributed to the respondents.  
As you can see from Table 2 the mean value of 4.13 does mean that the 
taxpayers do not get clearance within the standard time. This can also be 
substantiated by 53% and 13% of the respondents strongly disagreeing and 
disagreeing respectively with the idea that services are rendered within the 
standard time. Some of the respondents are highly aggrieved and stated that 
most of the time they get their clearance after a day. As per the researchers’ 
observation and informal interviews conducted with some taxpayers in some 
branches, the submission of financial statement is one precondition for 
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getting clearance. When taxpayers come to the office to collect their 
clearance the officers urge them to bring another financial statement as 
finding the originally submitted statement will take long time. This is due 
seriously to extreme shortage of employees in the branches. 
Compliance and service delivery aspect of repayment administration is one 
part of the broader compliance and service areas. Tx repayments entail 
attention to the taxpayers (OECD, 2011). With regard to this, the revenue 
bodies of different countries are faced by both compliance and service 
challenges. In this case expectation of timely servic  is more sensitive for 
ongoing challenge in balancing taxpayers’ expectation of good levels of 
service with responsibility for preventing and dealing with fraudulent and 
erroneous repayment of claims (ibid). As can be seen from Table 2, the 
mean value of 3.3 means that refund payments are not effected as per 
taxpayers’ expectations. This is supported by 38.7 % of them highly 
dissatisfied, 3.2% dissatisfied, 25.8% neutral, 15.1% satisfied and 17.2% 
highly satisfied. Even though the dissatisfaction leve  is a little bit higher 
than the satisfaction level, the 17.2% high satisfaction is attributable to 
improvement as a result of the Business Process Reengineering. In light of 
the national and international complaints regarding refunds, the 17.2% high 
satisfaction level cannot be undermined. But it needs further identification 
of problems to improve the service delivery. 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance 
Table -3 SPSS Results of Response Related to Fairness i  Service Efficiency 
 Does the tax administration 
fairly treat the taxpayers? 
145 1.00 2.00 1.5931 .49296 .243 
Do you think the service 
provided is good? 
138 1.00 2.00 1.5290 .50098 .251 
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Source: authors’ computation from questionnaire 
The mean value of 1.593 in Table 3 above reveals that t e respondents 
perceive the prevalence of partiality in the treatment of taxpayers. This is 
evidenced by the 59.3% of the respondents answering the question: “Does 
the tax administration fairly treat the taxpayers?” as no. From the same 
table, it can be understood that taxpayers perceive the overall taxpayers’ 
service is not fairly good. This fact can be supported by the 52.9% of the 
respondents viewing the taxpayers’ service as not go d. 
Ethiopian Tax Administration System in Light of Best Standards 
The most effective tax administration systems around the world are 
characterized by a tax gap of 10% or lower. The tax gap, which is defined as 
the difference between the taxes actually paid and the taxes which should be 
paid according to the existing laws and statutes, includes taxes not paid due 
to tax evasion, tax arrears (taxes declared but not paid), the shortfall in taxes 
due to taxpayers’ misunderstanding of the tax laws, and any other form of 
non-compliance. According to Carloss Cilvani and Katherine Baer (1997), 
the ideally effective tax system is characterized by the following attributes: 
• Good system of self-assessment based on taxpayers’ understanding 
of the tax system and their tax liabilities;  
• Good taxpayer treatment by tax authorities; as partne s for 
development   
• Systems and procedures in all areas of tax administrat on are well-
defined and used effectively by tax personnel; 
• The organization is well structured, managed, and fi anced;  
• Taxpayer services are available to a high proportion f the 
taxpaying population;  
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• Sanctions are adequate and systematically applied;  
• Audit activities are properly planned and targeted;  
• Computer technology effectively supports the tax administration’s 
operations and is continuously updated;  
• Tax administration staffs are professional and held to a high 
standard of behavior. 
In Ethiopia, the size of tax gap has never been studied in the history of the 
nation and tax potential of the country is obscure. However, the condition of 
the tax administration of the country can be discused in light of the 
attributes of best tax administration standards. Self-assessment and 
voluntary compliance is poor in Ethiopian tax administration system leading 
to focus on legal enforcement as a mechanism to collect tax revenues. A 
survey conducted by the IMF in 2011 indicates that v lue added tax 
compliance rate is about 25%. Since the introduction of the comprehensive 
tax reform in 1999 the tax administration authority has been providing 
taxpayer education with the use of different media such as pamphlets, 
television program, radio broadcasting and since rently direct forum for 
periodic dialogue with the taxpayers. The fact thatese measures improved 
the understanding of taxpayers cannot be neglected even though the 
expected level of voluntary compliance is yet to come. 
The tax authority has been under continuous institutional and administrative 
reform to improve taxpayer service and enhance voluntary compliance. The 
major administrative reform measure was the reorganization of the revenue 
sector into the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority. This 
restructuring has brought about improvement in operational programme, 
systems and procedures. The Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority’s 
administrative system is structured as a hybrid of the function base, the 
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taxpayer size base and the customer orientation base. This lead to the 
following as reform measures: the establishment of additional branch 
offices; training and recruitment of qualified personnel, introduction of 
performance and accountability measures and setting up a taxpayer 
education programme. The tax authority has been upgrading its computer 
system, introducing sales register machine for online tracking, implementing 
the use of a tax identification number for the enforcement, verification and 
processing of VAT refund claims. In 2012 large size taxpayers were offered 
online tax return filling service which is the first of its kind in the history of 
Ethiopian tax administration. But such service is yet to address the majority 
of taxpayers. The poor quality of human resource in the tax administration 
system has been one of the noticeable challenges in the tax administration 
system. The tax authority has more than 70% of its staff with bachelor’s 
degree or lower. But the international best practice standard shows that more 
than 70% of the personnel hold masters degree or above in relevant fields to 
tax administration. 
The tax audit and investigation in practice in Ethiopian tax and customs 
revenue authority is based on the risk based model of tax audit. That is, tax 
audit and investigation focuses on areas and sectors with huge potential of 
revenue loss because of tax evasion and avoidance. A y tax fraud identified 
leads to sanctions and penalties as per the legal provisions of the country. To 
this end, there was no record of a taxpayer arrested without alleged and/or 
proved non-compliance to tax laws of the country. Detected noncompliance 
to the governing tax laws has lead to criminal as well as civil suits against 
those who failed to comply with the legal requirements in place. While 
doing so the tax authority have been respecting the rights of the tax payers 
stipulated in the tax laws and other laws of Ethiopia. 
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Ecumenically speaking, the Ethiopian tax administration system in practice 
is far from achieving the indicators of the most effective tax administration 
system though the progressive development cannot be denied. With the 
comprehensive tax reform introduced since 1999 there as been radical shift 
in terms service, taxpayer education and compliance enhancing activities 
such as audit and investigation which are essential to enhance tax revenues. 
The government is committed to expanding its domestic revenue 
mobilization efforts to ensure fiscal sustainability. Since 2009 it continued 
to implement measures aimed at improving tax administrat on and 
enforcement. Tax revenues increased by 37% in 2010/11, compared with the 
previous year. However, the domestic revenue to GDP ratio increased only 
marginally from 11.2% in 2009/10 to 11.3% in 2010/11 because of a 34% 
increase in nominal GDP. Domestic revenues as a share of GDP increased 
to 13.2% in 2012. Ethiopian economy has been growing continuously since 
2004 and Ethiopia has been receiving complementary reports from the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund for its economic growth 
records. In absolute terms both the gross domestic product and the tax 
revenue have been growing. However, the tax to GDP ratio has begun to 
rise significantly only recently (i.e. since 2009) after implementation of the 
business process reengineering in the tax administration authority 
accompanied by strong legal enforcement measures. Figure-1 below 
summarizes the trend in Tax to GDP Ratio Performance i  Ethiopia in 
recent periods. 
Figure1-Recent Periods Tax to GDP Ratio Performance i  Ethiopia 















71Dejene Mamo, Lemessa Bayissa and Dawit G/Medihin 
 
International Status of Tax to GDP ratio of Ethiopia  
The international comparisons of the Ethiopian tax revenue to its GDP ratio 
revealed that it is among the lowest in the world. In 2012 the tax to GDP 
ratio of Ethiopia is reported to be 13.2% by the ministry of finance and 
economic development to be a record which is far below the average of sub 
Saharan economies of about 19%. The fact presented i  figure -2 below 
shows that the tax to GDP ratio of Ethiopia is the lowest not only in 
comparison with developed economies but also with the former socialist 
blocks of the Eastern European Countries. Although fi ure-1 indicates that 
the tax to GDP ratio has been increasing the interna io al comparison leads 
us to argue that significant improvement is mandatory in Ethiopian tax 
administration system. Strategies and operational actions that target the 
possible causes of low tax to GDP ratio should be pursued by the tax 
authority. The possible reasons behind low tax to GDP ratio include: tax 
avoidance, tax evasion, failure to tax the informal sector, failure to control 
misuse of tax incentives for investment. Figure-2 below indicates the tax to 
GDP ratio of Ethiopia at international level. 








tax to gdp ratio
tax to gdp ratio
 




In this paper we explored how taxpayers view the tax administration system 
in terms of securing voluntary taxpayers’ compliance, taxpayers’ 
understanding of the tax system, the taxpayers’ services provided by the 
revenue authority, and the fairness perception of the axpayers. We 
consulted relevant documents to supplement the results of analyses of 
primary data gathered through questionnaire distributed to non-randomly 
selected taxpayer respondents, informal interviews with some taxpayers, and 
researchers’ personal observations. Based on these analyses, the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
 Tax to GDP ratio is improving, though still among the lowest in the 
world. 
 Tax revenue performance is improving from year to year. 
 Taxpayers’ compliance that prevails currently, according to the 
perception of the respondents, is due to enforcement, not voluntary. 
 The level of understanding of tax laws by the taxpayers is low. 
 The respondent taxpayers believe that the revenue authorities’ 
treatment of taxpayers is partial. 
 The respondents perceive the taxpayers’ services as inadequate. 
 Recommendations 
Based on the findings, we recommend the following step  to be taken: 
Effort has to be directed towards enhancing voluntary compliance as 
enforced compliance is costly. To this end, improvement of taxpayer 
services, enhancing taxpayers understanding of the tax system through tax 
payer education programme and improving tax audit quality so that 
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taxpayers would feel they might be caught and sanctio ed if they commit 
evasions or frauds are the ways forward. Enhancing technological control 
mechanisms is also essential. This means the tax auhority should invest on 
the use of technology to easily track taxable transactions online. 
It would be good to work on simplification of the tax laws and taxpayers’ 
education using various media. We recommend intensiv  use of the 
traditional media such as television broadcasting, radio broadcasting, and 
periodic consultative discussions with taxpayers, informal social institutions 
such as idir and, iqubi as well as religious institutions. In addition to these, 
schools could be used to develop the attitude of the future generation of the 
nation regarding taxation. 
There is a need to check how impartial the treatmen of taxpayers by 
different departments is and to try to maintain impartiality as it plays a great 
role in securing voluntary compliance. The authority should study the 
impartiality and ethical integrity of its officer using psychometric analysis 
questionnaires. Proactive role could be exercised by testing the potential 
applicants for their impartiality and ethical integrity through the same 
mechanism during the employment process. There needs to be concern for 
retention of experienced tax officials and employees without prejudice to the 
authority’s human resource policy. 
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